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Abstract
Language can exert a strong influence on human behaviour. In experimental studies, it is
for example well-known that the framing of an experiment[1] or priming at the beginning of an
experiment[2] can alter participants’ behaviour. However, few studies have been conducted to
determine why framing or priming specific words can alter people’s behaviour[3, 4]. Here, we show
that the behaviour of participants in a game-theoretical experiment is driven mainly by social
norms[5], and that participants’ adherence to different social norms is influenced by the exposure
to economic terminology. To explore how these terminology-driven changes impact behavior at the
system level, we use established frameworks for modeling collective cooperative behaviour[6, 7]. We
find that economic terminology induces a behavioural difference which is larger than that caused
by financial incentives in the magnitude usually employed in experiments and simulation. These
findings place an increased responsibility on scientists and science communicators, as scientific
terminology is increasingly communicated to the general population[8, 9, 10].
Introduction
We start from the observation that economists tend to exhibit substantially different behaviour
in experiments pertaining to game theory and economics[3]. In particular, those who study, or
have studied, economics tend to act more in accordance with the predictions of microeconomic
theory, acting to maximize their own profits[4]. This raises the question why economists behave
differently. Some have proposed a self-selection mechanism, according to which people more inclined
to maximize their own profits are also more likely to choose to study economics[11]. Others have
proposed a learning mechanism where exposure to economic theory is the cause of the behavioural
differences[12]. In the past ten years, studies have repeatedly confirmed the latter mechanism where
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changes in behaviour are caused by exposure to microeconomic theory[13]. However, few studies
have engaged with the question of why a learning effect occurs[3, 14, 15, 4].
Here, we present evidence that engaging with microeconomic terminology inhibits cooperative
behaviour in a competitive game setting, and that engaging with an alternative terminology which
emphasizes collective, rather than individual, payouts increases cooperative behaviour. Applying
Bicchieri’s definition of social norms[5], we next show that these terminology-driven changes are
caused by social norms and not by alternative effects such as the terminologies enabling participants
to understand the experiment or biasing participants to prefer certain behaviours. We finally
use simulation methods from evolutionary game theory to assess whether observed individual
behavioural differences arising from terminology exposures are sufficient to take a collective system
across a tipping point to states of complete cooperation or defection in a simulated population.
The findings have impact beyond economics since they suggest that scientific terminology can guide
people’s behaviour by prompting specific social norms and that behaviour guided by these norms
can completely determine the outcome of a collective system.
For the initial experiments, we built an online platform where participants could play 10 rounds
of prisoner’s dilemma game (PDG). In a PDG, participants are faced with a choice to either defect or
cooperate with another player. If both players cooperate, their combined payout will be maximized.
However, for each individual player, choosing defection will maximize their own payout, regardless
of the choice of the other player. Finally, if both players’ defect, they will each receive a smaller
payout compared to the payout they get if both players cooperate. In order to test the behavioural
effects of scientific terminology, participants were randomly assigned to one of three categories -
individualist (I), collectivist (C), or neutral (N). Before proceeding to the game, participants in
all three groups had the structure of the PDG explained to them, and were required to correctly
answer a series of control questions to ensure they understood how their payout depended on the
actions of both players. In addition, participants in (C) and (I) were introduced to two distinct
concepts from microeconomics, and asked to apply them when answering the control questions,
and throughout the PDG. Participants in (I) were shown introduced to the microeconomic concept
of rationality and explained that in game theory it is called rational to maximize ones own reward
by defecting[16]. In similar fashion, participants in (C) were introduced to the concept of social
optimality [17] and explained that in game theory it is called optimal to maximize collective wealth
by cooperating. Players in (N) were not introduced to any concepts and their five control questions
emphasized collective and individual gain to the same extent.
Having tested for the behavioural effects of terminologies, we subsequently ran a follow-up
experiment to understand the role of social norms in the decision process. Here, participants
were asked two questions before playing each PDG. The first question asked which move they
expected the other player to make. The second questions asked which move they thought, the other
player expected them to make. Our goal was to determine whether there is a connection between
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participants’ expectations and their behaviour and whether the behavioural effects caused by the
terminologies are driven by these expectations such that they are caused by adherence to a social
norm of cooperation or to a social norm of defection[5].
If terminology can substantially change which social norms individuals follow, the question
then becomes: What is the effect of terminology at the collective level? We explore this question
through the lens of evolution of cooperative behavior[18, 19, 20]. Specifically we simulate agents
embedded in a network and use decision heuristics informed by empirical data on terminology-driven
changes in social norms to decide agents’ actions in a PDG based on their surroundings, following
[21, 22, 23, 24, 25]. We run these simulation experiments on artificial networks commonly used in
the literature, as well as networks constructed from real world data, using data from the Copenhagen
Networks Study[26].
Terminology influences behaviour
In order to assess the interplay between terminology and educational background, we recruited
participants in the (Behavioral Research Lab (BRL)) at the London School of Economics (LSE)
(n = 462) and on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) (n = 344). The participants played a PDG
with 10 rounds on an online platform, through which they were informed they would play against a
new participant in each round. In reality, they were playing a computer choosing randomly between
defection and cooperation. The experimental setup was approved by the LSE Research Ethics
Committee.
Among the BRL participants, 77 were associated with a degree involving at least two years
with economics courses. The degrees were core degrees from the three departments Economics,
Finance, and Accounting, and we refer to participants associated with these degrees as economists
for short. Consistent with results from previous PDG experiments[12, 13], we find that economists
cooperate less than the remaining BRL participants (linear regression on number of cooperate
moves, p = .0007, n = 462, t = −3.22, one-tailed). Comparing data sources, BRL participants
cooperated significantly less (p = .048, n = 810, t = −1.66, one-tailed). However, this difference
disappears when excluding economists from the analysis (p = .25, n = 733, t = −0.66, one-tailed).
Focusing on the remaining 733 participants from BRL and MTurk, we compare the number
of times participants in the collectivist, neutral, and individualist categories defected in the 10
rounds (fig. 1a). A Kruskal-Wallis test revealed a significant interaction between terminology and
cooperation (p = 6.8 · 10−9, n = 733, H = 38). A Conover-Iman post-hoc analysis[27] showed
that, compared with the neutral category, participants exposed to the collectivist terminology
cooperated more (p = .03, n = 487, t = 1.89, , one-sided), while the individualist category defected
more (p = 8.2 · 10−6, n = 501, t = 4.34, one-sided). Throughout the 10 rounds, participants in all
categories became more likely to defect (fig. 1b).
Considering the BRL participants, the difference between economists and non-economists is
consistent across all categories (fig. 1c-e). The magnitude of this behavioural difference between
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economists and non-economists is comparable to the effect of economic terminology. In particular,
economists exposed to a neutral terminology defected as much as regular participants exposed to
the individualist terminology (fig. 1d-e).
Fig 1. Interaction between terminology and behaviour. a Participants who had the game described in collectivist
(C) or individualist (I) terms cooperated and defected more, respectively. b throughout the 10 rounds, participants
in all categories became increasingly more likely to defect. Some difference persisted over time, especially
individualists defecting more than others. c-e Distributions over the number of cooperation moves among
participants exposed to the three terminologies, grouped by whether participants had a background in economics.
Bars represent the observed frequencies, and the markers represent the mean number of times cooperated.
Participants affiliated with an economics-related discipline consistently cooperated fewer times than other
participants, but terminology exposure had a similar influence on both groups. The mean for each distribution is
indicated with black markers. Error bars in all subfigures represent the standard error of the means.
Behavioural changes are mediated by social norms
One potential explanation of why terminology influences behaviour, is that language impacts
the salience of different social norms[14, 4]. We conducted a second experiment on MTurk (n = 200)
to understand whether social norms provide an explanation of the observed behavioural effects.
We adopt Bicchieri’s definition of social norms[5], which views a person’s behaviour is expressive
of a social norm if 1) they are aware that a behavioural rule exists and applies to their situation,
and 2) the person’s conforming to the rule is contingent on their first and second order beliefs
regarding general compliance, i.e. they must generally expect others to comply with the behavioural
rule, and believe others to expect them to comply, too. Note that conflicting norms can exist under
this definition[5]. The terminologies in the three categories were designed to provide participants
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with cues that a behavioural rule of cooperation (defection) exists for the collectivist (individualist)
terminologies, see methods for details.
To assess beliefs regarding compliance, participants were asked before each round whether they
expected the other player to defect or cooperate, and which choice they believed the other player
expected of them in turn. In the following, we will use the phrase ’expecting cooperation (defection)’
as shorthand for participants who expect cooperation (defection) of their opponent and believes the
same is expected of them. Note that the two are not exhaustive, as the first and second order beliefs
need not align. If the mechanism through which terminology influences behaviour is social norms
of cooperation and defection, we should expect any behavioural effect to be strongly contingent on
beliefs about compliance[28].
The results from the second experiment indeed show a strong correlation between expectations
and behaviour, as shown in fig. 2a. For example, in the first round, 88.2% of participants expecting
cooperation chose to cooperate, whereas 11.2% of those expecting defection did so. Within
the subgroups of participants expecting cooperation and defection, fig. 2a shows only a slight
difference between participants exposed to the three terminologies. However, terminology exposure
significantly impacts the probability for participants to hold such expectations, as depicted in
fig. 2b. Specifically, participants in (C) were significantly more likely to expect cooperation (p = .02,
n = 133, z = 2.06, one-tailed proportional z-test), and participants in (I) significantly less so
(p = .04, n = 145, z = −1.78, one-tailed proportional z-test), when compared to the neutral (N)
group. The number of times participants expected cooperation over the ten rounds also varied
significantly with terminology exposure (p = .003, n = 200, H = 12, Kruskal-Wallis test), and
similarly for defection expectations (p = .044, n = 200, H = 6.3). Excluding participants who
responded in a post-experiment survey that they either felt compelled to cooperate or defect
more, or suspected that the aim of the experiment was to influence cooperative behaviour, did not
significantly influence the results in this or the first experiment (details in methods).
The results visualized in fig. 2 support the hypothesis that scientific language, specifically
microeconomic terminology, can influence people’s behaviour by encouraging them to follow different
social norms. We draw this conclusion because the results cannot be adequately explained by the
alternative hypotheses. If the terminologies affected behaviour by biasing participants to prefer
one action over the other, participants’ choices would not depend on their first and second order
expectations regarding other participants[2]. Another proposed mechanism for such behavioural
effects is that language may shift the underlying utility functions for participants, such that acting
e.g. in an altruistic fashion results in a higher utility in spite of the lower payout[15]. This
explanation is also not compatible with the results, as participants were required to answer control
questions to ensure their understanding that defection (cooperation) would maximize individual
(collective) payout regardless of the choice of the other player. Therefore, if participants were simply
maximizing an underlying utility with larger values for individualist or altruistic behaviour, beliefs
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Fig 2. The interplay between expectations and terminology exposure. a The percentage of participants choosing to
cooperate in each round, grouped by expectations and terminology exposure. When participants expect cooperation,
meaning expecting the other player to cooperate and believing the other player expects them to cooperate, they are
much more likely to cooperate. Similarly, participants who expect defection are much more likely to defect. b The
percentage of participants exposed to each of the three terminologies (collectivist, neutral, and individualist) who
expect cooperation and defection, respectively. Participants exposed to the individualist terminology become more
likely to expect others to defect, and to believe that others in turn expect defection from them, and less likely to
hold the similar beliefs for cooperation. The opposite effect is seen for exposure to the collectivist terms. The error
bars represent error of the means.
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regarding general compliance should not affect the choices of participants. For the same reason, it
cannot be the case that terminology exposure simply helps participants better understand how to
maximize a preexisting individualist or altruist utility function.
The behavioural effects of terminology can drive simulated collective systems across
tipping points
The experimental results show that terminology can influence individual behaviour in a PDG
and that this influence can be explained in a social norm framework by a change in beliefs about
other people’s intentions and expectations. Having established the impact on social norms at the
individual level, we now explore how such terminology-driven shift in norms may impact behavior
on the systemic level. It has been shown that individual behavioural differences caused by social
norms may drive a collective system across a tipping point[29] and cause dramatic collective effects.
To investigate whether the observed individual behavioural effect from exposure to microeconomic
terminology are sufficient to drive a collective system across a tipping point in our case, we use
established methods from agent-based evolutionary game theory[21, 30] to simulate participants
exposed to the various terminologies interacting with each other in a network.
We run simulations on a real-world interaction network, obtained from smartphone data from
over 700 students in the Copenhagen Networks Study[26]. We construct interaction networks in
which nodes represents students, and links represent interactions along several channels including
text messages, physical proximity (measured by Bluetooth), and Facebook friendships.[31]. We
report results from the Facebook friendship network here, and refer to the SI for similar results
using the remaining networks, as well as commonly used artificial networks.
Agents in the simulation employ stochastic update heuristics[32], specifically a biased logit
model[22],
pc =
1
1 + e−βw·x
, (1)
which we fitted to the experimental data. In eq. (1), w is a weight vector including bias terms,
which were adjusted to the maximum likelihood fit to the experimental data. x is a state vector
which denotes quantities such as the past moves of the agent and their last opponent.
As participants in the three categories (C, N, and I) exhibited quite different behaviours, we
repeated this procedure independently for each group, and thus obtained three distinct agent-level
decision heuristics.
In order to assess any emergent phenomena the induced individual behavioural differences
might give rise to, we ran a series of simulated repeated PDGs. In order to probe specifically
the induced behavioural differences, we subtracted the bias terms from the neutral model from
the remaining two, so the resulting models represented the difference in behaviour relative to the
neutral category. Details of this, along with parameter values, fit quality measures, details on
alternate models, and visualizations of the resulting heuristics, are available in the SI. We then
defined a parameter ρI denoting the fraction of agents in a simulation which used the decision
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heuristic based on experimental data in the individualist category. The remaining 1− ρI fraction of
agents would then act according to the model fitted to data from the collectivist category. Results
from simulations on the real-world Facebook friendship network are illustrated in fig. 3.
Fig 3. Simulation results for a range of values of the ’temptation to defect’ t, and the proportion ρI of simulated
individuals which act similarly to people exposed to individualist, rather than collectivist, terminology. a The
tendency of cooperation to disappear entirely in simulation, for a range of parameter values. Predictably, this
tendency increases with the temptation to defect. However, varying the ratio of collectivists vs. individualists in the
simulation has much more pronounced effects, and takes the system across a tipping point, from complete
cooperation to complete defection. b, c Commonality measures for defection and cooperation, respectively, as a
function of the temptation parameter. Global commonality (pervasiveness) increases and decreases, respectively, with
temptation. Local commonality (prevalence), however, increases with ρI for both strategies, as the network becomes
more polarized and cooperators are forced to be more tightly clustered together in order to survive in spite of the
growing number of defectors. d Defection rates for selected values of ρI (indicated with dashed lines in a), averaged
over the final 5k iterations of simulations, as a function of temptation. e Progression of individual simulations for
specific values of ρI and t (indicated by the intersections of lines in a). The system generally goes to complete
cooperation or defection, but is volatile for values around ρI = .3. The lines are smoothened using a Savitzky–Golay
filter with window length 400 and polynomial order 5. All error bars represent the error of the means.
In these simulations, results were more sensitive to changes in ρI compared to t. Scanning the
temptation parameter t across the [1, 2] range gradually increases overall defection rates, while
increasing ρI takes the entire network from complete, or almost complete, cooperation, across a
tipping point into a regime of complete defection, regardless of t. The proportion of simulations in
which cooperators died out entirely is shown for a range of parameter values in fig. 3a.
For selected values of ρI , the outcomes of simulations for varying temptation values are shown
in fig. 3b. For the same values of ρI , and a single value of t, the progression of a single simulation
over 10, 000 rounds is displayed in fig. 3c, showing that for high and low ρI , the system quickly
settles to states of complete defection and cooperation, respectively. For values in between, the
system is volatile and can go either way.
While increasing ρI leads to decreased cooperation overall, the cooperators that remain tend to
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be more tightly clustered together. We can visualize this by dividing the notion of commonality
into pervasiveness (global) and prevalence (local). We define the pervasiveness of a behaviour
(cooperation or defection) simply as the fraction of nodes in a network that partake in that behaviour
at the end of a simulation. Prevalence is defined as the z-score of the observed number of e.g.
cooperate-cooperate neighbours, compared to a random permutation null model. Figure 3d shows
the commonality measures for defection as ρI is increased, and fig. 3e shows the same for cooperation,
showing that cooperators become much more tightly nit together (increasing prevalence) as their
numbers dwindle (decreasing pervasiveness).
Discussion
Our findings indicate that cooperative behaviour may be significantly influenced by exposure
to scientific terminology. Compared with a neutral group, we found that using different, but
equivalent, scientific terms to describe a competitive experiment, we could both amplify and
dampen cooperative behaviour. The terminology which reduced cooperative behaviour is standard
microeconomic terminology, and the reduction in cooperative behaviour was comparable to the
difference observed between participants enrolled in educations with and without a heavy background
in economics. We saw strong evidence that people’s choice to cooperate or defect were in part
governed by social norms, as participants were much more likely to elect a move which they
expected their opponent to play, and which they believed their opponent in turn expected of
them. The terminologies were able to alter behaviour in our participants, by manipulating these
expectations. We then used simulations to show that the behavioural differences introduced by
different terminologies were sufficient to drive a system across a tipping point between states of
complete cooperation and defection.
As science is becoming more broadly and popularly disseminated in the population, this places
a greater responsibility on science communicators to be understand that scientific language may
contain value laden terms which interact with social norms to produce emergent behavioural changes.
In addition, the findings emphasize the need for the experimental behavioural scientist to be aware
of how observed behaviours might be influenced by familiarity with relevant scientific terminologies,
both from the explanation of the experiment received by participants, and due to popular-scientific
communication. On a grander canvas, our results highlight how, for example, the language of
leaders or media – choosing to focusing on selfish rationality or social cooperation – may drive real
changes in people’s behavior.
In future experiments, it would be interesting to look for similar interactions between norms
and terminology within other scientific disciplines, as well as to expose groups of participants to
the same terminological stimulus to investigate directly the degree to which terms give rise to
emergent effects. Finally, further experimentation might attempt to directly influence empirical and
normative expectations, by providing participants with direct evidence that a certain behaviour,
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e.g. cooperation or defection, is more probable from other participants, or that other participants
are more likely to expect said behaviour.
Materials and methods
Experimental setup and data collection
The initial experiment on MTurk was carried out in November 2018. We used a predefined
setting on the MTurk platform to allow only ’master’ workers, with a consistent history of delivering
high quality work, to assess the experiment. Workers were paid a base pay of 2 USD for participating,
plus 10% of the points gained throughout the experiment as USD, resulting in a median earning of
3.6 USD. A total of 344 workers participated.
The experiment was repeated in December 2018, in the BRL at the LSE, with 466 participants
completing the experiment in batches of up to 20 people over the course of a week. 4 participants
were excluded for various reasons - 1 did not have a valid birth year in the laboratory’s database, 1
did not identify as either male or female, and 2 had opted not to fill out a short post-experiment
questionnaire in which participants could indicate whether they had played a similar game previously.
Here, participants where required to be physically present in the laboratory, playing the PDG
on computers located in individual booths. Participants received a base pay of 5 GBP plus another
10% of the points obtained in the experiment in GBP, resulting in a median earning of 6.7 GBP. Of
the 466 participants, 77 associated with a degree in either economics, finance, or accounting, each
of which requires at least 2 years with economics courses.
Finally, 200 participants were again recruited on MTurk in March 2019 to conduct the follow-up
experiment in which inquired about participants’ expectations regarding the choices of other players,
as well as their beliefs about the expectations of others. The workers were compensated in a similar
fashion as in the earlier MTurk experiment, with a median pay of 2.8 USD.
Players in the three categories were provided with different situational cues in the experimental
description by referring to other participants as either your opponent (I), the other participant (N),
or your co-player (C). This was intended to highlight competitive or communal aspects of the game
(fig. 4a).
Players were not allowed to proceed to the PDG before they had answered all five control
questions correctly. In this way we ensured that players understood the game and the terminologies
we had introduced. In addition, players would be asked to apply the learned terminology after each
of the rounds, to ensure their continued engagement (fig. 4c). More details and screenshots of the
platform are provided in the SI.
The additional text and focus in the control questions in (I) and (C) provided players with
normative cues, by applying value-laden labels to the defect and cooperation strategies (fig. 4a).
Assessing experimenter bias
In order to mitigate effects of experimenter bias, participants were asked - after completing the
experiment - whether they suspected that a particular hypothesis was being tested. Participants
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Fig 4. Overview of the experimental setup. a Participants in the collectivist (C) and individualist (I) categories
receive situational cues emphasizing competitive or communal aspects of the game. Participants in the neutral (N)
category received no normative cues and other participants were referred to as “the other participant” to avoid
situational cues. b The structure of a prisoner’s dilemma game. If players cooperate, their combined payout is
maximized. Each individual player will receive a larger playout from defecting rather than cooperating,
independently of the other player’s action. c Participants answer a series of questions to ensure they understand the
game and the terminology being introduced to them. In each round, they choose to cooperate or defect, and the
computer presents them with the results of the present round, and asks them a follow-up question involving the
introduced terminology to ensure their continued understanding and engagement.
who responded positively were allowed to describe in a text field what they believed was being
tested in the experiment. We identified responses which indicated that participants either believed
that some effect of language on behaviour was being tested, or that a particular action was in some
way the right one. A summary of the responses is shown in table 1.
BRL MTurk 1 MTurk 2
C N I C N I C N I
“Language” 6 0 7 1 1 2 2 0 1
“Defect” 13 12 24 2 2 3 0 0 0
“Cooperate” 8 4 3 0 1 2 1 0 0
Table 1. Overview of the number of people who reported in a post-experiment questionnaire to suspect that
various effects were being tested. “Language” means the participant stated that they believed the aim of the
experiment was to test some form of effect of language on participant behaviour. “Defect” and “cooperate” refers to
participants believing that defection or cooperation was the right strategy to choose.
Redoing the statistical analyses while excluding participants from table 1, the main findings
remained significant. The number of times participants cooperated was still different in the three
terminology groups (p = 1.4 ∗ 10−8, n = 660, H = 36, Kruskal-Wallis test). The fraction of
participants expecting cooperation (believing their opponent would cooperate, and believing the
same was expected of them) in the first round was also higher for the collectivist terminology group
(p = .017, n = 192, z = 2.11, logistic regression, one-tailed z-test), but not so for defection (p = .15,
n = 192, z = 1.03). However the total number of times participants expected cooperation/defection
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across the ten rounds remained significantly higher in the collectivist/individualist exposure groups.
Models and parameter estimation
We model the choices of an individual agent as a stochastic function of variables representing
information available to the agent. We considered the family of logit dynamics[22] models, which
has previously been used in the context of evolutionary game theory[32]. We write a general logit
dynamics model on the form
pi =
eβwi·x
Z
,
Z =
∑
j
eβwj ·x .
(2)
Here, x is an input vector representing the information based on which an agent makes their
decision, and wi is a weight vector that represents the real-valued relative importance of each
component of the information x for deciding upon choice i. Hence, one may view
Gi(x) = wi · x (3)
as representing the degree to which the available information x favors a decision of i to the agent.
The β parameter determines the degree of stochasticity, so that probability distribution arising
from the model depends more strongly on the Gi for large values of β. When β = 0, the choice is
made uniformly at random, independently of the Gi, and in the limit where β →∞, the option
i′ corresponding to the greatest value of Gi is chosen deterministically, with ties being broken
randomly.
To allow for biases in an agent’s decision, we introduce into 2 a bias term bi, which we add
to Gi. To retain the vector notation for Gi in 2, we put the bias term as the first element of the
weight vector, w
(0)
i = bi, and let the corresponding element of the input vector be unity x
(0) = 1.
We denote the possible choice in a given round of the PDG c, for ’cooperate’, and d for ’defect’.
The probability distribution over the choices is is then given by:
pc =
eβwc·x
eβwc·x + eβwd·x
,
pd =
eβwd·x
eβwc·x + eβwd·x
.
h (4)
Due to normalization, this may be simplified as
pd =
1
1 + e−βw·x
,
pc = 1− pd,
(5)
where
w = wd −wc (6)
Based on this, we tried fitting several different models to the data:
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1. One model in which the state vector x of eq. 3 contains only information on defecting behavior,
i.e. indicator variables for whether the player and their opponent defected in the previous
round, and the payouts obtained by the player and the random neighbor, in the event they
defected. For instance, the indicator variable denoting whether the player defected in the
previous round would be δp,d, i.e. a Kronecker delta taking the value 1 if the player defected
in the previous round and 0 otherwise, and the payout variable would be δp,d · fp, i.e. the
player’s payout from the previous round if they defected, and zero otherwise.
2. A similar model, but allowing separate values and indicator variables for cooperation.
3. A model as the above, but allowing the bias term to depend on the previous action taken by
the player and their opponent.
The free parameters of each model were then fitted using the COBYLA optimization method[33] to
minimize the negative log-likelihood of model. Some constraints were imposed upon the parameters
to avoid performance degeneracies in the parameter space - β was constrained to positive values,
and the norm |w| of the weight vector was set to unity. The fitting procedure was repeated 10 times
with parameter vectors randomly initialized in each run to mitigate the problem of local optima.
The majority of runs converged and resulted in very similar negative log-likelihoods, with a few
outliers at greater values, confirming the necessity of multiple runs of the fitting procedure. For the
majority of runs which both converged and had similar likelihoods, the parameter vectors returned
by the algorithm were closely clustered together. This was not the case when the aforementioned
constraints were omitted, indicating that the constraints were indeed necessary to remove parameter
space degeneracies. Performance metrics for the best fits for each model are summarized in table 2.
In addition to the models described above, two additional types of models were considered. One
such type of models was similar to models 2 and 3 above, but instead of incorporating a bias term
in 3 the bias would be outside the exponential function so pd ∝ α eβwd·x, turning 5 into 11+C e−βw·x ,
where C = 1−αα . However, this resulted in the same values of the performance metrics as models 2
and 3. We also investigated models which took history from the previous two rounds, rather than
just one, for the participants into account. This, however, resulted in a slightly worse fit to data,
as well as higher model complexities. In addition, we tried a model that also explicitly took into
account the T parameter from the payout matrix. This slightly increased model likelihood but
decreased the AIC score due to the additional model complexity. For this reason, we proceed with
model 3, without the T parameter.
The state vector x consists of the following components: An indicator of the immediate game
history H available to the player, i.e. of whether they and their opponent cooperated or defected
in the previous round, as well as the payouts they, and a random person in their neighborhood,
received from cooperating and defecting in the previous round. x may be written as
x = (δH,cc, δH,cd, δH,dc, δH,dd, δs,dps, δs,cps, δn,dpn, δn,cpn)
′
, (7)
where δH,ij is a Kronecker delta which is 1 if the player and their opponent played strategies i and
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Model n − lnL(w) Accuracy AIC F1
1 6 3011 .76 6059 .83
2 10 2777 .81 5614 .87
3 9 2725 .86 5503 .90
Table 2. Summary of various performance metrics for the models. The table displays the number of model
parameters n, and the negative log-likelihood − lnL(w) of each model along with its accuracy. As more complex
models would be expected to fit any data better, we also provide the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) score[34].
As the data are unbalanced (with many more choice to defect than to cooperate), we also provide the F1 score for
the models.
j, respectively, in the previous round. Similarly, s and n are used as indices of the player themselves
and the random neighbor, respectively, with p denoting payout.
Parameter adjustments for simulations
To account for the fact that most simulation approaches use a weak PDG, the model requires
a few adjustments after the fitting procedure. First, the fitted heuristics display a very strong
bias towards defection, possibly because participants in the experiment played a strong prisoner’s
dilemma game, with a game matrix given by T = t, R = 2, P = 1, S = 0, with t lying in (2, 4),
whereas in our simulations, in order to align with the literature, we use T = t, R = 1, P = S = 0,
with t in [1, 2]. Second, the stochasticity in the fitted model leads to low stability in clusters of
similarly acting agents, and negates interesting network effects[35]. Third, in accordance with
other literature finding that experimentally determined neighbor influence is quite low[36], which
adversely affects simulations[35].
The latter obstacle we overcome simply by fixing the weights representing the impact from
neighbor payouts on an individual’s choice to the same as the weights for the individual’s own
payouts. This matches well with the literature, in which every individual heuristic we encountered
also treated payouts for the individual in question and their neighbors on equal footing. The problem
of stability we mitigated by enforcing a rule that if an individual seeking to update their strategy,
and the randomly selected individual neighbor with whom they compared strategies and payouts,
had both followed the same strategy, the agent would deterministically choose that strategy. Finally,
to compensate for the increased incentive to defect in the strong vs. weak prisoner’s dilemma game,
we shifted the bias terms so biases for the neutral data were at zero, while retaining differences
between bias terms for the three terminologies. This adjustment was performed in the following way:
From β and the weight vectors w (which include the bias terms) in eq. (5), a vector of ’absolute
weights’ V are computed as V = β ·w. These are equivalent to the weights in e.g. a normal logistic
regression model. Notice that, as we’ve used the constraint w is L2-normalized, we have β = |V|
For a given terminology exposure i, the corresponding vector Vi may be thought of as a
concatenation of the weight vector vi and a vector of biases bi, i.e. Vi = vi ⊕ bi. This vector is
then offset by the biases from the neutral terminology, i.e.
V′i ← Vi − 0⊕ bn, (8)
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Adjusted Raw fits
C N I C N I
wsd .23 .26 .22 .31 .47 .34
wsc .21 .24 .17 .28 .36 .31
wnd .23 .26 .22 .017 -.01 .015
wnc .21 .24 .17 -.042 -.03 -.035
bcc -.11 0 .054 -.81 -.78 -.75
bcd -.049 0 .1 -.42 -.42 -.25
bdc -.033 0 .054 .00 .052 .17
bdd -.046 0 -.0072 -.02 .047 .037
β 4.6 3.9 5.7 3.5 3.0 2.7
Table 3. Parameter values for the agent logit model. The rightmost columns contain the values obtained directly
by fitting to experimental data, and the leftmost columns show the adjusted values.
where bn represents the biases in the neutral model. We may rewrite this as V
′ = β′w′ for
consistency with previous notation. The parameters for the three models (C, N, and I) after this
transformation are displayed in table 3
The models given by the parameters in table 3 are visualized in fig. 5.
In the main paper, we investigate the effects of terminologies by running simulations in which
varying fractions of the individual agents employ the decision heuristics based on the collectivist and
individualist terminologies, respectively. We probe this through the parameter ρI , which denotes
the fraction of agents that are randomly assigned to follow the model based on the individualist
terminology, labeled ’I’ in fig. 5, whereas the remaining 1 − ρI follow the model based on the
collectivist terminology. Hence, values of ρI = 0 and ρI = 1 correspond to ’pure’ systems in which
every agent employs the heuristics from the collectivist and individualist terminologies, respectively,
whereas intermediate values correspond to ’mixed’ systems in which both groups of agent coexist.
We consider the interactions between terminologies, as expressed by ρI , and the ’temptation to
defect’ parameter t, and a range of quantities, such as the fraction of agents defecting, the mean
payouts for all nodes in the network, a ’pairing measure’ capturing to which degree cooperating
agents are connected to fellow cooperators at a disproportional rate, etc. As agents embedded
in social networks are known to exhibit a high degree of homophily in terms of communication
and media consumption[37, 38, 39], we also investigate the effects of increasing the terminology
homophily by assigning terminologies in way which makes agents exposed to similar terminologies
more likely to be connected.
We present a brief overview and explanation of these quantities, and give summarize exploratory
analyses of their interplay with networks structure and clustering in the SI.
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Fig 5. Visual depiction of the agent heuristics with parameters displayed in table 3. Each plot corresponds to the
outcome of a round based on which a given agent is making a decision to potentially update their strategy. Rows
correspond to the agent’s previous strategy, and columns to their opponent’s strategy, so each plot corresponds to
the corresponding cell in the game matrix. Each line corresponds to a terminology (C, N, or I), and the strategies
chosen by the agent’s neighbor, and the neighbor’s opponent in the previous round. For example, the label ”N-DC”
corresponds to a model based on the neutral terminology, and the situation where the agent’s neighbor defected
while their opponent cooperated. The x-axis represents the t parameter, and the y-axis the probability of the agent
defecting pd. Note that we do not show lines for situations where the agent and neighbor played the same strategy,
as the agent retains their strategy in that case.
16/36
References
1. Tversky, A. & Kahneman, D. The framing of decisions and the psychology of choice. science
211, 453–458 (1981).
2. Molden, D. C. Understanding priming effects in social psychology: What is “social priming”
and how does it occur? Social Cognition 32, 1–11 (2014).
3. Marwell, G. & Ames, R. E. Economists free ride, does anyone else. Journal of public
economics 15, 295–310 (1981).
4. Gerlach, P. The games economists play: Why economics students behave more selfishly than
other students. PloS one 12, e0183814 (2017).
5. Bicchieri, C. The grammar of society: The nature and dynamics of social norms (Cambridge
University Press, 2005).
6. Szabo´, G. & Fa´th, G. Evolutionary games on graphs. Physics Reports 446, 97–216 (2007).
7. Lieberman, E., Hauert, C. & Nowak, M. A. Evolutionary dynamics on graphs. Nature 433,
312–316 (2005).
8. Davies, S. R. Constructing communication: Talking to scientists about talking to the public.
Science Communication 29, 413–434 (2008).
9. Sugimoto, C. R. & Thelwall, M. Scholars on soap boxes: Science communication and
dissemination in ted videos. Journal of the American Society for Information Science and
Technology 64, 663–674 (2013).
10. Kirby, D. A. The changing popular images of science. The Oxford Handbook of the Science
of Science Communication 291–300 (2017).
11. Carter, J. R. & Irons, M. D. Are economists different, and if so, why? Journal of Economic
Perspectives 5, 171–177 (1991).
12. Frank, R. H., Gilovich, T. & Regan, D. T. Does studying economics inhibit cooperation?
Journal of economic perspectives 7, 159–171 (1993).
13. Ifcher, J. & Zarghamee, H. The rapid evolution of homo economicus: Brief exposure to
neoclassical assumptions increases self-interested behavior. Journal of Behavioral and
Experimental Economics 75, 55–65 (2018).
14. Ferraro, F., Pfeffer, J. & Sutton, R. I. Economics Language and Assumptions: How Theories
can Become Self-Fulfilling. Academy of Management Review 30, 8–24 (2005).
17/36
15. Cappelen, A. W., Nygaard, K., Sørensen, E. Ø. & Tungodden, B. Social preferences in the
lab: A comparison of students and a representative population. The Scandinavian Journal
of Economics 117, 1306–1326 (2015).
16. Mas-Colell, A., Whinston, M. D., Green, J. R. et al. Microeconomic theory, vol. 1 (Oxford
university press New York, 1995).
17. Binmore, K. Just playing: Game theory and the social contract II (1997).
18. Axelrod, R. & Hamilton, W. D. The evolution of cooperation. Science (New York, N.Y.)
211, 1390–6 (1981).
19. Milinski, M. TIT FOR TAT in sticklebacks and the evolution of cooperation. Nature 325,
433–435 (1987).
20. Trivers, R. L. The evolution of reciprocal altruism. The Quarterly review of biology 46,
35–57 (1971).
21. Nowak, M. A. & May, R. M. Evolutionary games and spatial chaos. Nature 359, 826–829
(1992).
22. Blume, L. E. The Statistical Mechanics of Strategic Interaction. Games and Economic
Behavior 5, 387–424 (1993).
23. Rand, D. G. & Nowak, M. A. Human cooperation. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 17,
413–425 (2013).
24. Santos, F. C. & Pacheco, J. M. Scale-Free Networks Provide a Unifying Framework for the
Emergence of Cooperation. Physical Review Letters 95, 098104 (2005).
25. Nowak, M. A. Five rules for the evolution of cooperation. science 314, 1560–1563 (2006).
26. Stopczynski, A. et al. Measuring large-scale social networks with high resolution. PloS one
9, e95978 (2014).
27. Conover, W. J. & Iman, R. L. On multiple-comparisons procedures. Los Alamos Sci. Lab.
Tech. Rep. LA-7677-MS 1–14 (1979).
28. Bicchieri, C. & Xiao, E. Do the right thing: but only if others do so. Journal of Behavioral
Decision Making 22, 191–208 (2009).
29. Nyborg, K. et al. Social norms as solutions. Science 354, 42–43 (2016).
30. Adami, C., Schossau, J. & Hintze, A. Evolutionary game theory using agent-based methods.
Physics of life reviews 19, 1–26 (2016).
18/36
31. Sapiezynski, P., Stopczynski, A., Lassen, D. D. & Lehmann, S. Interaction data from the
Copenhagen Networks Study. Scientific Data 6, 315 (2019).
32. Wu, Z.-X., Guan, J.-Y., Xu, X.-J. & Wang, Y.-H. Evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma game on
Baraba´si–Albert scale-free networks. Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications
379, 672–680 (2007).
33. Powell, M. J. D. A direct search optimization method that models the objective and
constraint functions by linear interpolation. In Advances in optimization and numerical
analysis, 51–67 (Springer, 1994).
34. Akaike, H. A new look at the statistical model identification. IEEE transactions on
automatic control 19, 716–723 (1974).
35. Gracia-La´zaro, C., Cuesta, J. A., Sa´nchez, A. & Moreno, Y. Human behavior in Prisoner’s
Dilemma experiments suppresses network reciprocity. Scientific reports 2, 325 (2012).
36. Grujic´, J., Fosco, C., Araujo, L., Cuesta, J. A. & Sa´nchez, A. Social Experiments in the
Mesoscale: Humans Playing a Spatial Prisoner’s Dilemma. PLoS ONE 5, e13749 (2010).
37. Halberstam, Y. & Knight, B. Homophily, group size, and the diffusion of political
information in social networks: Evidence from Twitter. Journal of Public Economics 143,
73–88 (2016).
38. Hermida, A., Fletcher, F., Korell, D. & Logan, D. SHARE, LIKE, RECOMMEND.
Journalism Studies 13, 815–824 (2012).
39. Dvir-Gvirsman, S. Media audience homophily: Partisan websites, audience identity and
polarization processes. New Media & Society 19, 1072–1091 (2017).
40. Barabasi, A.-L. & Albert, R. Emergence of scaling in random networks. Science (New York,
N.Y.) 286, 509–12 (1999).
41. Sekara, V. & Lehmann, S. The strength of friendship ties in proximity sensor data. PLoS
ONE 9, 1–14 (2014). arXiv:1401.5836v3.
19/36
Self-interested behaviour as a social norm
Supplementary Information Appendix
Kamilla Buchter, Bjarke Mønsted, & Sune Lehmann
20/36
Experimental setup
Design of the first experiment
The experiment had four parts. First, participants were presented with the title “A Choice
Experiment” and read a general description of the experiment. Second, they were asked to read
a description of the game and answer five control questions which ensured that they understood
the rules of the game. Participants could not proceed to the game before all five control questions
were answered correctly. Third, the participants played ten rounds of PDG. After each round,
participants were informed about the choice made by their opponent, their own pay-off from the
game, and the choice and pay-off of another random participant.1 The participants were then
asked a follow-up question about the random participant in order to make them engage with
this information. The participants could not continue to the next round of PDG before they had
answered the follow-up question correctly. Finally, after playing the ten rounds, participants were
asked to state whether they had played this type of game before, and if they had guessed the
hypothesis tested in the study. The experiment took less than 15 minutes to complete.
The PDG played by the participants had the pay-off structure T > R > P > S where S = 0,
P = 1, R = 2, and T was selected uniformly at random from the interval (2, 4). The two strategies
were called cooperate and defect. The pay-off structure is depicted in table 6. The entire experimental
set-up can be seen at: http://ahura.herokuapp.com/.2
Fig 6. Structure of the PDG played in the experiment. The numbers indicate the points that players can
win, where T ∈ (2, 4) is chosen at random for each player. The value of T for each participant remains the same
throughout the experiment.
To test the effect of microeconomics textbooks terminology, participants were randomly allocated
to one of three categories in the experiment. The control category used a neutral terminology and
did not introduce a microeconomics concept. The second category used an individualist terminology
and asked participants to read a text excerpt stating that in game theory the word rational is used
to denote the strategy of defecting. The third category used a collectivist terminology and asked
participants to read a text excerpt stating that in game theory the word optimal is used to denote
the strategy of cooperation. The two text excerpts were designed to be similar in their formulation,
so that the only difference is whether they apply a positively laden word to the strategy of defection
1The information about the random participant was generated by the computer at random.
2To go to the experiment, enter a random sign in the field for an identification code, press “I agree - continue to
study”, and press “submit”.
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or to the strategy of cooperation. Both words relate to concepts used in microeconomics, though
rational behaviour is more widely used than socially optimal outcomes.3 Next, we provide a detailed
account of the stimuli used in each of the three categories.
0.0.1. Neutral terminology
The first category in the experiment used a neutral terminology in order to provide a control
version to which the other two terminologies can be compared. In this category, participants
were greeted with the sentence “Welcome! You are about to take part in a study on how we
make strategic choices.” Further, the other participant was used to describe other players in the
experiment. The category did not introduce a microeconomics concept and the control questions
pointed both to dominant strategies and to the benefit of cooperation without any normative
wording:
1. If, in a given round, the other participant and you both play ‘cooperate’, how many points do
you receive?
2. In a given round, you choose ‘defect’ and receive 1 point. Which strategy did the other
participant choose?
3. If the other participant plays ‘defect’ in a given round, which strategy should you choose to
ensure that you get the greatest possible number of points?
4. If the other participant plays ‘cooperate’ in a given round, which strategy should you choose
to ensure that the two of you receive the greatest possible total number of points? Hint: for
each strategy combination, sum the payoffs you and the other participant will receive.
5. Assume that in a given round you choose ‘defect’ and receive T . Which strategy did the other
participant choose?
Finally the follow-up question after each round said:
• A random participant played [cooperate/defect] in the previous round, and received a payout
of [T/2/1/0].
Which strategy did that player’s opponent choose?
This ensured that participants engaged with the information they received about the random
participant’s game.
0.0.2. Individualist terminology
The second category of the experiment used an individualist terminology to mirror the language
of standard microeconomics textbooks. The terminology was introduced through four changes to
the experiment.
3Notice that the texts presented in the experiment provide a somewhat simplified version of game theory since
rationality and social optimality is concerned with utilities rather than monetary gains. Thus, the concepts only
apply to the experiment under the assumption that participants will increase their utility by increasing their wealth.
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First, the title of the experiment was accompanied by a small subtitle “A study on rationality”
and participants were greeted with the sentence “Welcome! You are about to take part in a study
on rationality.” Further, your opponent was used to describe the other players. These situational
cues were supposed to indicate to the participants that they were in a competitive situation.
Second, participants were asked to read a short text introducing the microeconomics concept of
rational to describe the choice of defecting in the game. The text was:
A concept of particular interest in this study is the notion of rationality. In game
theory, we say that it is rational for a player to choose a strategy, if the strategy is
guaranteed to result in a greater payoff to the player, regardless of which strategy their
opponent plays. Conversely, we say that it is irrational for a player to choose a strategy
that does not guarantee the highest possible payoff (regardless of what the other player
chooses), if a strategy that does so is available. The following contains a few control
questions to ensure that you understand these concepts and their relation to the game.
Third, control questions 3-5 were changed in order to ensure that participants understood the
concept of rationality and knew how to apply it. The three control questions were:
3. If your opponent plays ‘cooperate’ in a given round, which strategy should you choose to
ensure that you get the greatest possible number of points?
4. If your opponent plays ‘defect’ in a given round, which strategy should you choose to ensure
that you get the greatest possible number of points?
5. Given your answers to the above, how would the ‘defect’ strategy be classified according to
game theory?
Finally, the follow-up question after each round of the game was changed:
• A random participant played [cooperate/defect] in the previous round, and received a payout
of [T/2/1/0].
How does game theory categorize this strategy?
The participants could either answer rational or irrational. This change ensured that participants
engaged with the information about the random participant and that they used the microeconomics
terminology throughout the experiment.
0.0.3. Collectivist terminology
The third category used a collectivist terminology. The collectivist terminology was designed to
mirror the individualist terminology by having a parallel sentence structure. The terminology was
introduced through four changes to the experiment.
First, the title of the experiment was accompanied by a small subtitle “A study on cooperation”
and participants were greeted with the sentence “Welcome! You are about to take part in a study on
cooperation.” Further, your co-player was used to describe the other participants in the experiment.
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These changes were intended to provide the participants with a situational cue that they were in a
cooperative situation.
Second, participants were asked to read a short text introducing the concept of optimal to
describe the choice of cooperating in the game:
A concept of particular interest in this study is the notion of social optimality. In
game theory, we say that an outcome is socially optimal if it results in the largest overall
payoff and if no one can be made better of without making someone else worse off. We
call a strategy that can lead to a socially optimal outcome optimal. Conversely, we call
a strategy suboptimal if it cannot lead to a socially optimal outcome. The following
contains a few control questions to ensure that you understand these concepts and their
relation to the game.
Third, control questions 3-5 were changed to ensure that participants understood the concept of
optimality and knew how to apply it:
3. If your co-player plays ‘cooperate’ in a given round, which strategy should you choose to
ensure that the two of you receive the greatest possible total number of points (i.e. which
choice maximizes the sum of the points that you and your co-player receive)?
4. If your co-player plays ‘defect’ in a given round, which strategy should you choose to ensure
that the two of you receive the greatest possible total number of points? (i.e. which choice
maximizes the sum of the points that you and your co-player receive?)
5. Given the above how may we classify the role of the ‘cooperate’ strategy in increasing overall
wealth?
Finally, the follow-up question was changed to:
• A random participant played [cooperate/defect] in the previous round, and received a payout
of [T/2/1/0].
Which of the following best describes this strategy choice?
The participants could either answer optimal or suboptimal.
Design of the second experiment
In order to ensure that the situation in the second experiment is comparable to the situation in
the first experiment, we used the same experimental design as reported above. However, we made
one change to the experiment. In each round of the PDG, participants were asked two additional
questions, before they indicated which strategy they wanted to play. The first question was designed
to ask about the participants’ empirical expectations, while the second question was designed to
ask about participants’ normative expectations. The questions were:
• Which strategy do you think the other participant will choose?
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• We also ask the other participant which strategy they think you will choose. What do you
think the other participant answers?
The participants could answer cooperate or defect to each question. For participants in the
collectivist category in the experiment, “the other participant” was changed to “your co-player”.
For participants in the individualist category, it was changed to “your opponent”.
Interplay between heuristics and network
This section provides an overview of the classes of real and artificial networks we considered for
analyses, as well as a range of possible update heuristics for the agents embedded in the simulations.
As simulations behave differently in each of the relatively large number of combinations of network
types and update heuristics, we provide an overview here along with some qualitative reasons for
our choice of focus in the main paper.
The networks considered fall in one of two categories - real, and artificial, i.e. constructed using
real-world data, and constructed computationally, starting from a small set of simple rules. The
artificial networks under consideration are:
• A simple 2-dimensional square lattice (SL), such as the one considered in Nowak and May’s
famous 1992 paper on evolutionary games[21]. In this network, each node is connected only
to its 4 neighbours - north, south, east, and west, with periodic boundary conditions.
• An Erdos–Re´nyi (ER), in which every pair of nodes (u, v) are randomly connected, each with
an independent probability chosen as 1%.
• A Bara´si-Albert (BA) scale-free network[40] constructed by starting with a set number m of
interconnected nodes, and then grown using a preferential attachment scheme in which each
new node is attached to m existing nodes with probabilities proportional to the degrees of
the nodes. In the literature, we encountered results from simulations on BA networks with
parameter choices ranging from m = 4[24] to to m = 8[32], leading us to use m = 6.
All networks mentioned in the above were constructed with a size of n = 625 nodes.
In addition to this, a range of networks constructed from real-world data were also employed.
The data used to construct all such networks comes from the Sensible DTU experiment[26] at the
Technical University of Denmark. The experiment consisted of a large number (> 700) of Danish
university students, who received smartphones which, with their consent, registered information
regarding contact patterns, sensor information, etc. The data for a one-month observation period
of this study are made publicly available[31]. From this, the following networks were constructed.
• A text message (SMS) network with any two nodes (u, v) connected if either had texted the
other during a one-month observation period, containing a total of n = 457 nodes.
25/36
• A Facebook (FB) network consisting of n = 800, with users linked if they were friends on
Facebook.
• A Bluetooth (BT) network with n = 542 nodes. This network consists of temporal ’slices’ of
periods of one hour. During each such time slice, an edge (u, v) is present if the corresponding
users were in physical proximity of one another during the period, as identified by the
Bluetooth sensors in their phones. Proximity was then detected by thresholding signal
strengths to RSSI values above −90dB, corresponding to distances of a few metres[41].
In addition, we considered a range of different update heuristics for agents engaged in repeated
games on various graphs. A brief overview of the heuristics considered, as well as some descriptions
of their qualitative differences, is provided below.
1. A ’local maximum’ heuristic in which agents consider themselves and their neighbourhood,
and copy the strategy of whichever node received the greatest mean payout in the previous
round.
2. An ’individual max’ heuristic, in which agents follow the same procedure as above, but only
compare themselves with a single node from their neighbourhood, which they choose uniformly
at random.
3. An ’local softmax’ heuristic, in which nodes consider the payouts earned by themselves in
the previous round, and the average payout of neighbors using the opposite strategy. If all
neighbors used the same strategy as the nodes, its strategy will not update. Otherwise, it
will use the two payouts as inputs to a softmax function which determines the probabilities of
the strategies.
4. An ’individual softmax’ heuristic similar to 3 but comparing the node to a randomly selected
neighbor.
5. A ’local stochastic softmax’ heuristic, similar to 3, but without the constraint that nodes
must deterministically reuse their previous strategy if nobody in their neighbourhood played
the opposite strategy in the previous round.
6. A ’individual stochastic softmax’ heuristic, similar to 5, but considering only a randomly
selected neighbor.
The heuristics outlined in items 1 to 6 lead to different global dynamics on different networks. In
figs. 7 to 12 these dynamics are shown for a range of network structures. In each figure, each row
of subfigures corresponds to a network structure. The right column of subfigures summarise the
influence of the ’defection temptation’ parameter t. The subfigures show the fraction of nodes
defecting after 104 simulation steps, averaged over an additional 103 steps (red) as well as the
pairing measure (gray) obtained in a similar way. The dashed lines show the value for t resulting in
the value of ρI that is as close as possible to the midpoint between the maximum and minimum
values for ρI .
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For this value t∗, an additional simulation was run for each network. The end states after 104
time steps are illustrated in the left columns of subfigures, with red and blue denoting defectors
and cooperators, respectively. The central columns show the degree distributions of the networks,
coloured based on defection rates - for each degree, a score was computed by taking the average
number of times nodes of each degree defected in the last 103 iterations of the simulation. The
nodes were then coloured based on the ranks of those scores, with more defection/cooperation
corresponding to more blue/red colours.
The above preliminary investigations reproduce several findings from the literature. One example
is the sharp phase transition on the square lattice in figure 7, first observed by Nowak and May.
Note that the transition occurs at slightly lower values of t, because we opted for an asynchronous
update scheme in which 10% of nodes, rather than all of them, changed their strategy in each round.
Other such findings include under stochastic heuristics, network structure has little to no effect[35],
as shown in e.g. fig. 11. Finally, we reproduce the finding that, when using a non-deterministic
update heuristic, BA and ER networks facilitate similar levels of cooperation[32].
In the first experiment - from which the data we intended to fit these heuristics to originated -
participants were presented with information about a single node in their vicinity, leading us to
limit ourselves to the ’individual’ heuristics presented above. The deterministic examples of such
heuristics, such as that described in 2 are ill-suited to fit to data, a single data point can have
a likelihood of zero. At the same time, we wanted a model for individual behaviour which, like
those encountered in the literature, can accommodate relatively stable regions of cooperators and
defectors. Hence, we ended up fitting a stochastic individual softmax model like that described in
item 6, which we then adjusted to have such properties. The methods section of the main paper
describes these adjustments as well as the fitting procedure.
Effects of clustering
In order to investigate the effects of distributing different update heuristics across a network
in a non-uniform fashion, we devised a method of sampling from an ensemble of networks with a
continuously varying degree of clustering with regards to terminology category, i.e. varying the
tendency for nodes to be disproportionally connected to nodes that act according to the same
model (meaning model trained on participants exposed to the collectivist, neutral, or individualist
terminology).
The clustering parameter α
We did this by defining a hyperparameter α, signifying the degree of clustering. We then start
with a network in which there is no category assigned to the nodes, and perform the assignment
in the following fashion. A category is selected based on a predefined parameter ρI , so categories
are chosen with pd = ρI and pc = 1 − ρI . Then, with probability α, the chosen category n is
assigned to a node selected using a Baraba´si-Albert style preferential attachment mechanism[40], in
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Fig 7. summary of the local maximum heuristic (1).
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Fig 8. summary of the individual maximum heuristic (2).
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Fig 9. summary of the local softmax heuristic (3).
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Fig 10. summary of the individual softmax heuristic (4).
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Fig 11. summary of the local stochastic softmax (5).
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Fig 12. summary of the individual maximum heuristic (6).
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Fig 13. As the clustering hyperparameter α increases, the assortativity coefficient r of the categories grows
accordingly. r appears to be growing the most in sparser networks, such as the artificial lattice, or the real text
message network.
which a node u is selected with a probability proportional to the number of its neighbours having
been assigned category n. With probability 1− α, the node is selected uniformly at random. This
procedure is repeated until each node has been assigned a category. Figure 13 shows the dependence
of the category assortativity coefficient r on α for a range of network structures.
Simulation results
In the following, we present the results of a series of simulations and show the resulting metrics
discussed in section 0.0.3. For each metric, we run a series of simulations, for a range of values of ρI
and t, and for three values of the clustering parameter α, repeated for the SMS, FB, BA, and SL
networks discussed in section 0.0.3. For each combination of network and α value, we present a 2D
heatmap showing how the quantity in question changes with ρI and t. Each cell in these matrices
is computed by running 10 simulations for 104 iterations, and averaging the values taken by the
quantity over the last 5000 iterations. The cell is left white in cases where the measure is ill-defined
- for example, the pairing measure is not defined when all nodes either cooperate or defect, as the
denominator becomes zero in those cases.
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Fig 14. The fraction of defectors in the network after running the simulations.
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Fig 15. The prevalence measure Zc.
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